The Home NodeB (HNB) is used for providing the 3rd Generation (3G) wireless coverage in a home for User Equipment (UE) of the 3G. The HNB comprises the function of one standard NodeB (one element of the macro radio access network of the 3G) and the function of radio resource management of one standard Radio Network Controller (RNC).
FIG. 1 describes the system structure of the HNB, wherein the interface between the UE and the HNB of 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is a backhaul and compatible air interface in the Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN). The HNB accesses the operator's core network through a Security Gateway (SeGW), and the bandwidth Internet Protocol (IP) backhaul between the HNB and the SeGW is possibly insecure, and the information transmitted in this backhaul requires protecting by a secure channel established between the HNB and SeGW. The SeGW is on behalf of the operator's core network to carry out the mutual authentication with the HNB, and the HNB Gateway (HNB GW) and the SeGW are entities logically separated in the operator's core network for use in the access control of the UE of the non Closed Subscriber Group (CSG). The Operation Administration and Maintenance (OAM) is required to securely communicate.
FIG. 2 describes the system structure of the Home evolved NodeB (HeNB), and the difference between the system structures of the HeNB and HNB is that that HeNB connects the UE of the 3GPP with the air interface of the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (EUTRAN).
The H(e)NB includes the HNB and HeNB, which is a common name of the HNB and the HeNB. Regarding the security of the H(e)NB, the 3GPP Technical Report (TR) 33.820 defines 27 types of threats, and these 27 types of threats are classified into 7 species, namely the hazard to the H(e)NB qualification certificate, the physical attack on the H(e)NB, the attack on the structure of the H(e)NB, the attack on the protocol of the H(e)NB, the attack on the core network, the attack on the data and identity privacy of the user, and the attack on the radio resources and management.
Wherein, the attack on the core network comprises the attack based on the location of the H(e)NB. The 3GPP TR 33.820 provides a scheme that the location locking mechanism overcomes the attack based on the location of the H(e)NB, and as shown in FIG. 3, this location locking mechanism mainly comprises following steps of:
step 301, the location register of the H(e)NB;
step 302, the location authentication of the H(e)NB.
However, in the practical application, regarding the universality and flexibility of the H(e)NB application, this location locking mechanism is quite faulty, and currently related specifications also do not provide any solution to locking the new location after moving the H(e)NB.
Since the H(e)NB is able to be moved, if the location of the H(e)NB is unable to be locked after moving the H(e)NB to a new location for various reasons, then the H(e)NB will not be reused. Thereby, the emergency call sent from this H(e)NB will not be reliably located, or not be sent to the correct emergency call centre; besides, the legal interception of the location report will become impossible.
In the existing H(e)NB location locking mechanism, one piece of location information only corresponds to one location identifier. However, in the practical application, the H(e)NB is likely to obtain various different types of location information at different times. Although the location of the H(e)NB is not moved, different types of location information will necessarily cause the failure of locking the location, and further cause that the H(e)NB is unable to be registered and used, which cries for one location which is able to pass the authentication of the various different types of location information.
Besides, in the current method for locking the H(e)NB location, besides the solution based on the IP address is required to obtain the location identifier from the Connectivity Session Location and Repository Function (CLF), solutions based on other location information all take the location information initially reported by the H(e)NB as the location identifier, which brings a series of security threats caused by the use in the illegal location, and since the H(e)NB is possibly located in an illegal location during the initial use, namely use in the unallowable use range, for example accessing the operators' networks irrelevant with the H(e)NB.
Thus it can be seen that it is required to propose a more perfect and effective scheme for implementing to lock the location of the H(e)NB so as to increase the reliability of locking the location of the H(e)NB and the locking success probability, and solve various inconveniences and threats caused by the location of the H(e)NB being moved.